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• On the Social Life of Postsocialism: Memory, Consumption, Germany By Daphne 
Berdahl  
• The History of History: a Novel of Berlin By Ida Hattemer-Higgins 
The imperative to remember is everywhere and it is quite peculiar. It usually involves 
recalling something not experienced by the person doing the recalling and it is undertaken 
according to quite different compulsions and motivations. Governments are often involved 
in impelling such historical recalling through schools, memorials, and other means. It is an 
imperative to be obeyed, but it can be ignored. The pitiable dead are invoked for memorials, 
lest we forget them and that is usually what we do. Cultural heritage sites, museums, or 
books of old photographs all enjoin us not to forget what has gone. They and everything 
else we are asked to remember as well as what we remember from our own lives are 
poignantly compelling in the face of the fact that nearly everything and everybody has been 
and will be forgotten. What we are enjoined to remember are ‘markers in the struggle 
against the furies of disappearance and forgetting’ (Assmann 2006: 81). 
Whether willingly obeyed or compelled, the command to remember in the case of Germany 
is a school-bred imperative that often breeds routine learning and then indifference. It 
involves recalling what has been turned into two irrevocably distanced pasts, those of the 
Cold War division and the Eastern Republic, the GDR (German Democratic Republic) before 
unification, and that of the Nazi Third Reich. For Jews it is the Holocaust, carrying a secular 
command to remember it as an event, as well as the liturgical command to remember God – 
an important distinction of two kinds of command that run in parallel with each other in 
Israel (Yerushalmi 1996). 
Reading these two books has prompted me to think about the willing obedience of the 
command to remember and how it involves various kinds of identification with that past. I 
wonder whether this might be similar to ethnographic empathy, which brings those who 
would have been ignored and forgotten to a recorded life. To change the terminology from 
willing obedience and empathy, I might also introduce this review as an appreciation of 
different ways in which the distanced and perennially threatened past is animated by 
recalling it through lives that are its case studies and compare it to the animation of the 
strange made familiar and the familiar made strange – which is the habitus of 
anthropological research. 
  
Daphne Berdahl at her untimely death in 2007 was a young and already accomplished 
anthropologist. In her writings she animates a very recently distanced East German past as 
well as making the familiar strange and then familiar again to the non-local reader, as all 
good ethnographers do. Another young woman, Ida Hattemer-Higgins (H-H from now on) 
animates the past of the Third Reich in Berlin by inventing a character who undertakes the 
process of animation. Both authors raise fascinating issues about history and personal 
recalling, whether they can be separated, what the place of emotions are in both. Curiously 
it is H-H who through another character, a therapist who is also a blind gynaecologist, raises 
more forcibly the problem of entrapment in the present, how the present of the person, in 
the mental state into which she has been cast by a deeply painful personal event, recalls 
and animates the past using it for what might be therapeutic ends by treating the past and 
its presence in the city of Berlin as a mirror and a screen for self-projection and self-
protection. Each book presents a number of textual stratagems for recalling, distancing, 
animating and commenting, as you will see. 
Daphne Berdahl arrived in the East German border security zone to start fieldwork in the 
village of Kella in December 1990, only a year after the abolition of the border in November 
1989. The year 1989 is hailed throughout the world of international affairs as an end-date, 
the End of the Cold War, making that bipolar world a past whose history could now be 
written. But as Heonik Kwon has pointed out so persuasively (2010), it is really a year within 
a long period of what he calls the long ‘decomposition of the Cold War’. Daphne Berdahl’s 
ethnography (1999) describes the beginning of that decomposition. Learning how to cope 
with a socialist dictatorship has given way to learning how to cope with a capitalist 
democracy and the coping has, according to Berdahl, been through several phases of what 
she also calls consumer citizenship, the greater choice and freedom to buy. It is being freed 
to cross the border to reunite with relatives and to use the gifts of Deutschmark given to the 
easterners at reunification, freed to seek work from employers in the West and Western 
employers in the East, replacing the failed Eastern manufacturing industry. The east/west 
border is replaced by Ossie/Wessie categorisation and discrimination. The mutual 
categorisation is laced with the irony of the dominated, conveyed in jokes such as Wessie 
piously professing ‘We are all one people’ and Ossie replying ‘So are we’. 
The decomposition, as recounted by Berdahl, is experienced through permutations of 
consumer disadvantage. They start with extraordinary instances of didactic consumerism. 
She attended three sales meetings to which village women were attracted by 
representatives giving ‘seminars’ about products for food storage, cosmetics, and nutritional 
supplements, pitched as lessons in how to consume and how to succeed by using your body 
in the new world they were entering. I suppose this is not so extraordinary since we all 
receive advertising that purports to teach us how to look and be seen and how to present 
ourselves more assertively. But these sessions struck me as extra blatant. She succeeds here 
in making the familiar strange, and locating it in a peculiar political circumstance. 
But Daphne Berdahl’s point was different, that image seminars are instances of a 
convergence of the consumer with the democratic citizen (2010: 98). She makes her point 
as a descriptive insight rather than as a critique, writing in the mode of the anthropology of 
consumption, as if it were the new reality of world economies somehow supplanting 
production, so that she avoids critique of exploitation and discarded labour even while 
describing it with great empathy. Perhaps this anthropological economy (as distinct from 
political economy) is the result of being close to the subjects of ethnography, an 
unwillingness to set them in an analytical context that is not a refinement of their own self-
contextualisation. It is also of course an anthropological mode of theorising, illuminated by 
the heralds (the Comaroffs and Appadurai) of a new global world of commodities. 
References to them surround her reflections on consumer citizenship (2010 chapter 6). 
What stands out from these surroundings are her wonderfully caustic descriptions of 
consumer rites in Kella (1999: 170-73 and 2010: chapter 2), sharing her village subjects’ 
combination of humiliation and defiant humour. For instance, the lecturer-saleswoman on 
nutrition supplements is ‘a well-dressed yet sickly looking woman in her midforties with 
smokers’ teeth, bleached-blond hair, and prematurely aged, yellowish skin (apparently the 
result of years of tanning coupled with a heavy smoking habit)’ (1999: 170). Thus she moves 
closer in to the consumer and then away into anthropological references, illuminating those 
references with her descriptions. Good writing, good scene-setting, is the stuff of good 
literature, whether fact or fiction, but here, because of the ethnographic mode of 
presentation and description, reinforced by anthropological references, it is analytic 
reportage. It is, in its presentation and by the very words used, a descriptive vignette, not 
requiring us to follow her into an imagined reconstruction but inducing a reader to see what 
she saw. 
And it is already the stuff of history, the first stages in the decomposition of the cold war 
seen from a border village. Her ethnography will be (or should as other ethnographies have 
been) used as more or less primary materials by historians, despite the fact that she is 
already writing as a historian. 
Can history also be personal, for instance when it is on the case study scale, moving from a 
locality to larger spatial and temporal scales via comparative references? A first answer 
would have to be that even as a case study it excludes most of the people she knew and 
met, let alone the others in Kella that she did not come to know well. But for further 
answers, I turn first to Berdahl’s first major ethnography, a study of the Washington 
Vietnam martyr’s memorial (2010: chapter 1, first published 1994). The memorial itself was 
the result of a campaign by Vietnam veterans and their supporters, eventually endorsed by 
central government. Their successful petition was a questioning of the history then being 
written and pronounced. Further, the memorial contests the unified history celebrated in 
the other, pomped memorials of the historical formation of the USA in Washington. The 
memorial that was built unified veterans’ perspectives and is therefore much more 
ambivalent, both for and against the conduct of that war. But are the memorial and its 
reminiscences, undoubtedly personal, also history? Obviously the memorial commemorates 
an historical event. But could it not be more, since the letters and objects left at the wall 
elaborate a contested war? They express and are relieved by being able to express the 
bitterness and therefore to envisage the healing of the wounds of war by expressing 
bitterness, bringing together relatives and veterans who felt that heretofore they had been 
forgotten, or were (as Black soldiers) still marginalised just as they were in the war itself. 
Some of them have become models for the telling of subsequent stories left there, and for 
rituals by veterans at the memorial wall and the mobile wall exhibitions and their replicas 
touring through the states of the USA. As in eulogy and graveyard, personal lives are thus 
turned into a distinct genre of commemoration. So, the personal messages have become 
standardised for a rite of commemoration, but are they also a retelling of history? 
In the end, Berdahl names them ‘historical memory’, forms of identity that are personal but 
also stylised. What is surely remarkable is that these materials of history, or rather 
alternative histories of the war, are so prolific and inclusive. As such they convey the 
personal feelings that the histories and their memorial evoke, but not the history itself. The 
messages and objects are communications of the living with the dead, dead lovers, dead 
comrades-in-arms, dead sons and daughters, representing a burgeoning wish to be heard 
that constituted a social movement and created the event of the construction of the 
memorial as a continuation of that social movement. The event is history, and so is the 
social movement. Of course the war contained countless stories, lives reduced to statistics, 
then to brief stories and letters. But the war and even the memorial to its US veterans when 
turned into events of a history are written as a summary without any more than selective 
recourse to the poignant and stylised personal honourings of the dead. Even such a 
historian as Catherine Merridale, whose marvellous account of World War 2 from the point 
of view of the Russian soldier through innumerable quotations from soldiers’ letters, is not 
so much rewriting the history of the campaigns as conveying their feel from the soldiers’ 
point of view (2005). She is enlivening history with feelings through personal stories. What 
she has been able to do is create something like a memorial with letters, as Daphne Berdahl 
does in her essay and as the memorial itself does. Events and their explanations get filled in 
by these means and by memoirs and reportage, but there is and must remain a separate 
telling of events and their illustrative case studies of places and some people. 
Having noted this distinction, let me turn my attention to the empathy that animates the 
case study, the finding of personal lives in events and histories, and ethnographies. Most 
personal is when Daphne Berdahl brings herself into her ethnography. It is an honest story, 
revealingly of misidentification with the local person with whom she formed a close 
friendship. When she found that this woman friend, a Catholic like all the villagers but more 
devout than most of them, had become one of the small group of women serving the 
church and its priest, including his devotion to the Focolare movement that glorifies 
suffering and piety, Berdahl found herself taken into a common observers’ stance with the 
priest, a reluctant identification with him through her friendship with the woman even 
though she was not comfortable with it and thought she had a different view from that of 
her friend. Then when her woman friend was found to have a tumour on her brain, Berdahl 
organised expert medical second opinions to the ones locally available just as she had done 
earlier in trying to save her own mother from cancer, a losing battle despite her mother 
receiving all the advice. But her friend did not take their advice. Berdahl was angry at what 
seemed irrational conduct, which distanced her from her friend. But then one Sunday she 
saw, literally, that ‘Her actions and demeanour [conducting her duties during the service] 
revealed an intensity of faith and purpose that I suddenly almost envied, and at that 
moment it occurred to me that her deep religious faith – and her devout practice, indeed 
her embodiment of it – just might be keeping her alive’ (2010: 77). The description is 
interspersed here with published accounts of their fieldwork by other ethnographers, 
removing the reader to a greater contemplation before moving him back into her personal 
focus with this last sentence of the section. ‘That Sunday after mass, with tears in my eyes 
and hands trembling, I lit a votive candle for my mother’ (2010: 78). From being distanced to 
then bringing herself to an even closer reidentification with her friend, Berdahl infuses her 
fieldwork with the release of her own grief for her mother. 
Oddly, she did not make of this work, field and grief work, a personalised, internal discovery 
of the village. Instead she turned herself into a case study of self as constraint upon 
empathetic knowledge and then of release from that constraint by an experiential opening 
up to a new knowledge in her capacity as an ethnographer. She makes her self a case study 
of ethnography as such. Her woman friend is a separate case study, of the larger field of the 
changing institutions of the Catholic church, from being an institution of local assertion to 
becoming another state-like institution with which locals find ways of coping. Her friend and 
her friendship are cases of a Catholic church before or while it became a more remote 
administrative authority and of Kella’s Catholic sense of community as it dispersed into 
several paths of affiliation and destiny. The separation of herself and of her friend as case 
studies could be wise, since we can never be sure that the new insight is less fallible than 
the first, though both were necessary. In any case, in both she is writing history, of the 
general and changing conditions of Kella and of the current condition of ethnography. In 
both she provides just a case, not the documentation of the personal lives from which she 
has selected two for her insights. Both cases do animate their contexts with personal 
feelings and make them vivid, but they are highly selective, as indeed they must be to 
illuminate what must be more drily described and analysed. 
How different this is from what can be done in fiction is evident when reading Ida Hattemer-
Higgins’ The history of history; a novel of Berlin. An apparently technical enquiry into history 
(which first drew me to the title) the novel turns H-H’s work as a tour guide in Berlin into an 
unfolding personal occupation of (not just a preoccupation with) the city and its history. H-H 
did work as a tour guide, and through the fictional tour guide, Margaret, history is duly 
brought into question, but through another character’s pronouncements. 
The narrative follows Margaret’s routes through Berlin, as she sees it, from a wood (Berlin is 
a very wooded and green city) through the streets in her own neighbourhood, on the way to 
her lover – a university teacher of history – in another part of the city, to her gynaecological 
therapist or to archives of the Nazi past and importantly through the variations she plays on 
her tours for tourists to see the recent past in the present buildings and streets of the city. 
She is so invested in these streets and buildings that they appear to her as flesh and blood, 
the living being of Berlin and its history. Descriptions of masonry and its various states as 
flesh and health or wound is a well met challenge of this double fiction. The reality principle, 
holding the fantasy but not damaging it, enters through episodes spent with her large-
headed, almost blind gynaecologist, the questions put to her by tourists, and the actions of 
her lover that we eventually discover to have been the cause of the personal trauma that 
has brought about this fantastic waking vision. 
Rarely does the reader meet another observer of Margaret. She it is who almost solely, but 
for her gynaecological and therapeutic checks, bears the reader’s view. The vision becomes 
nightmarishly seductive when giant birds inhabit the living fabric and tempt Margaret into 
another story, following or being carried off by one hawk-like bird-person, a personification 
of Magda Goebbels who married Goebbels to be close to Hitler, her first love, and who 
killed her children and herself in Hitler’s bunker rather than live on in a depleted world after 
defeat in 1945. Margaret also sees other apparitions from the past with whom she can talk, 
in particular the Jewish family of Regina Strauss, whose own suicidal and child-killing fate 
under the Nazis has become an obsession with innocence for Margaret to offset her 
visualisation of Magda Goebbels. 
My flat, sparing prose cannot convey the luxuriant prose of H-H that saturates every 
sentence with the several senses of experience. For instance, at the point when Regina 
discloses something that shatters all that Margaret had cherished in her recovered past ‘She 
wanted to flee – to flee for the rest of her life. It is impossible to describe how searingly 
Regina’s words burnt into her mind. 
Margaret raised her arm to shield her face, but could see the woman was changing. She was 
darkening, broadening, and seemed covered in fat and fur. A pelt had grown on her. And 
more than anything now, it was the smell of grasses. A smell of grasses in the body of a fine 
and splendidly muscled animal. She was taller than Margaret now, far taller – she was filling 
out into the most dangerously mothering animal of all – she was a brown-black member of 
the ursine family, a rearing bear, with paws like hands, eyes like pinecones, and mouth 
sweet and dandy and deadly. 
Margaret covered her face. 
She heard a low moan. It may have been her own’ (pp 275-6). 
The image of the bear emerging gradually through the short sentences and through the 
reversed similes of humanity and non-humanity of a bear (‘paws like hands, eyes like 
pinecones’) is peculiarly American, not German (‘dandy’) appropriately for a German 
American (Margaret and the author). The splitting of Margaret’s image of herself, this time 
auditory (‘the sound of a moan’) is the opening of the spaces of the whole book and its 
theory of ghosts, ‘the leftover resonance of a style of being, the intense and prolonged 
sympathetic vibration, in this world, of a life in the next. Once, caught in the sleeve of time, 
Margaret split herself in two and released a ghost of herself. The ghost went lost and 
wondering. But now here it was coming home again’ (p. 312). 
Solipsistically, and typically of this book, the ghost is the forward and outward projection of 
the split self from the central character, but it could as well be the animations of projected 
pasts that she, the character and her author, undertakes from the pasts of the Third Reich. 
Through Margaret, H-H is enabled by fiction to inhabit the city of her studies (the blurb 
describes her as ‘a student of literature in Berlin’ as well as a tour guide). As tour guide, 
probably as she says of Margaret, she bought many books and went to many archives. 
Fiction also enables her to comment on fiction as fantasy and by extension say something 
about the empathy of participant observation and the animation of a recent past as fantasy 
that has the power to remind us by its own dynamic of discovery of what we would prefer 
not to know, what forces us to change our interpretations, what destroys one fantasy and 
creates another, more suitable one (bird to bear, human maternal ideal to human maternal 
capacity for defensive and inhuman violence) or just the reminder of the dark ambivalence 
of hope or innocence. 
Margaret’s second visit to the gynaeco-therapist bears the title that is also the title of the 
book: The History of History. By this point, a third of the way through Margaret’s journeys 
through Berlin, it is becoming clear and this chapter makes it doubly clear that the book is a 
journey through the latter part of what is for her, Margaret, a ‘lost time’ in her life. She is 
suffering from amnesia and the gynaeco-therapist is her memory doctor. Margaret reports 
that the buildings have become flesh but otherwise nothing has changed since her last visit, 
no recalling of memories. In response the memory-doctor makes her a series of propositions 
of the relation between history and memory. ‘You’ve been reading history so that it will be 
easier for you to shed your own flesh. That is the history of history – the violence against the 
body for the sake of the skeleton’ (p. 119).  Her flesh of memory is discarded onto a history, 
in order to preserve herself simply as skeleton. ‘If you have to see the buildings alive, then it 
will put a stay of execution on your murder of time’ but it is only a stay, before ‘the truth of 
character’, Margaret’s own sense of guilt returns (p. 120). The guilts of the Nazi era are a 
screen for the transposition of her own guilt. Or, in reverse, that with which she animates 
the past is her own guilt, hidden in the lost time of her own much more recent past. ‘You 
can never stop worrying over the shadows of your own riddling heart!’ (p. 120). ‘The world 
is pregnant with your own face, and it will never give birth to anything else’ (p. 121). On the 
other hand, finding and telling stories is to find meaning, to play a ‘symphony in a cave 
where nothing but a whimper dwells….If you recognize that fact once and for all, the 
meaning you will eventually have no choice but to construct will be proportionate. That is to 
say, it will be very small. You will know it to be essentially provisional, even fraudulent! – 
and then, as a result, it will be powerless, and remembering all things unbearable will 
become bearable to you’ (p. 123). The punch in that last line is the unbearable not only in 
the story of her own life but also in the history into which she pours her life. And it will be 
modest and fraudulent and recognised as such, because it is only an approximation to the 
truth of the characters of the past, even when much later Regina Strauss (or rather 
Margaret’s researches into Regina Strauss and animation of her character) become as 
threatening as a mother bear. 
This is the equivalent in H-H of Berdahl’s shock recognition of her own grief in her 
recognition of her field friend’s therapeutic piety. Still fraudulent, but nearer the truth. And 
note too the denigration of narrative as mere search for meaning, when the truth is feeling 
not story, which in the end is the whimper of a life, a truth so small that its modesty must 
always be overplayed by the stories we try to tell and that are in all ways preferable to that 
version of the truth of character at the end of a life, as the memory doctor is toward the end 
of her’s. 
Memory work is the compulsion to tell stories against the whimper before death. This 
contention is quite similar to Jan Assmann’s reference during an interview with the 
sociologist Thomas Macho in which Macho described cultures as islands in the ocean of 
oblivion (Assmann 2006: 81). 
Writing as I am doing and as Berdahl does, foregrounds references. It makes them into 
confirming or contentious ways out from the authored text, whereas the references in 
fiction, such as epigraphs and in-text quotes – an example in H-H is a quote from Hitler’s 
manifesto Mein Kampf that she and the reader find to be unexpectedly common and good 
sense – serve the fiction. References in fiction are, I think, overwhelmed by the story and its 
characters, whereas in an academic review such as this, or in an ethnography such as 
Berdahl’s, the quotes stand as points of support that can be interpreted in ways that go 
against the grain of the author’s exposition. Argument and exposition are, in this and many 
other ways, different from fiction not just as genre but in what they expect of a reader. 
The contrast is especially clear between H-H’s and Berdahl’s equally good writing because 
there is such a dominant fictional character inhabiting H-H’s research on and in Berlin, 
whereas Berdahl’s own voice is surrounded by those she quotes from her fieldwork and 
those she references from her academic sources. But the contrast holds for even the most 
multi-voiced fiction. Even when many leading characters have interwoven stories, all their 
voices are those of the fiction. The most dialogic of novelists is Dostoievsky, whose works 
according to Bakhtin and to Williams (2008) subjected Dostoievsky’s theology to an 
experimental test and an exemplary indetermination. But even in The Brothers Karamazov, 
the ultimate exemplar of dialogic fiction, the open-ness of characters and their potential 
futures are still enclosed in the fact that they are part of a story told as a world for itself. 
Fiction can be read as an analogy or an allegory of a world, whereas ethnography claims to 
be a description, and crucially a provisional description of that world. Even so, the ideas in 
the fiction, such as the idea that the only truth of a history is to capture a tone and a 
character, namely a feel and not just through a case study, the rest being just story-telling to 
seduce us from reality, could be disputed and could, as I am doing, be left as one thought 
among others, a thought with resonance worth following. It is saying that character and feel 
of a time past should be an historian’s aim, not so much event stories. History in this 
contention is all animation, not just the occasional blast of animation by personal cases. 
Further, despite their differences both fiction and ethnography give us the drama of 
moments when Berdahl the ethnographic author or H-H’s main fictional author of the story 
finds herself completely upset in what she had settled on as the truth of her key subject in 
the field of exploration. This doubling back of exploration shakes our, as readers, as well as 
the authors’ acceptance of what she has written. Further, by logical extension, they open 
the possibility that this new confirmation of the truth, a highly ambivalent and emotive 
truth, is itself provisional, shakeable by a further experience and dream of self-knowing. 
Both are reminders that we are our main instruments of knowledge, and a reader has to 
insert another self for further knowledge. Both close their accounts by means of the finality 
of a story or of a life, most tragically Berdahl who herself succumbed to cancer and an early 
death. We now read her work as both history and memorial. The book I am reviewing is 
edited by one of her close colleagues Matti Bunzl as a memorial celebration of her life as an 
ethnographer. 
Fiction and ethnography, both, add lives and therefore life to history and theory. Both are 
personal, and so add the tone and perspectives of their authors to the researched story. But 
we seldom check the research done for a fiction, though we may doubt or accept its 
verisimilitude, whereas others in the same ‘field’ certainly do check ethnography. Both 
ethnography and fiction are ghost stories, in that they are forward projections of a time past 
into the present of the authorship and then of the reader. But ethnography, and a review 
like this one, if less seductive than fiction, are written in so many more registers of 
commentary and point-arguing that such playing with temporality that fictions such as H-H’s 
does can not only be floated as a device to be considered but also be formally proposed by 
it. Animation is a backward and forward projection into and from a past into the presents of 
authorship and then of readership. Historians and ethnographers play this temporal game 
as an act of recognising and calling into memorability what they recognise. 
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